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Abstract
How a cost shock is passed through into nal consumer prices may relate to nom-
inal price stickiness and rigidities, the existence of non adjustable cost components,
strategic mark-up adjustments, or other contract terms along the supply distribution
chain. This paper presents a simple framework to assess the potential role of non linear
pricing contracts and vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance or wholesale
price discrimination in the supply chain, in explaining the degree of pass-through from
upstream cost shocks in the ground co¤ee category to downstream retail prices. We
do so in the German co¤ee market where both upstream and downstream rms make
pricing decisions allowing for non linear pricing and vertical restraints. Using coun-
terfactual simulations of an upstream co¤ee cost shock, we nd that the existence of
resale price maintenance between manufacturers and retailers increases pass through
rate by more than 10 points relative to the case when this assumption is not allowed
with non linear pricing or when double marginalization along the distribution chain
is present. The intuition for our ndings is that resale price maintenance restrictions
make it less possible for retailers to perform strategic mark-up adjustments when faced
with a cost shock. We also nd that the less concentrated upstream sector, and also
the less elastic demands rms face, the larger the role of vertical restraints in pre-
venting retailers to perform strategic mark-up adjustments, and thus the higher the
pass-through increases.
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1 Introduction
Wholesale prices have collapsed over the last three years from nearly $2.40 per lb to just
under 50 cents, the lowest levels in thirty years. Allowing for the e¤ects of ination, co¤ee
has never been so cheap. Not that the consumer would have guessed. In the supermarket,
a 100g jar of Nescafe Gold Blend has risen in price from £ 1.56 to £ 2.14 since 1994.,
The Guardian, 2001.1
Understanding the sources of the extent to which a cost shock is passed through into
nal consumer prices, dened as the degree of pass-through, has important implications
for industry and for the economy generally. Assumptions about these sources shape econo-
mistspolicy recommendations in many markets as diverse as oil, automobiles, and co¤ee.
There is a large theoretical and growing empirical literature on explaining what would be
contributing to incomplete retail price transmission of upstream cost shocks, or incom-
plete transmission of exchange rate shocks into countries domestic consumer retail prices
(Campa and Goldberg, 2005, 2006). Several forces that may contribute to incomplete
pass-through have been identied in the trade literature in terms of the existence of local
non traded cost components (see e.g., Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2010). Nominal price
stickiness and rigidities (Engel, 2002; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2010; Nakamura and Ze-
rom, 2010; Noton, 2008), long terms contracts (e.g. Bettendorf and Verboven, 2002) and
the possibility of making strategic mark-up adjustment along the supply distribution chain
(Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Nakamura and Zerom,
2010; Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010) may also explain the degree of pass-through.
The contribution of this paper is to examine empirically the role of non linear pricing
1http://www.jubileeresearch.org/worldnews/africa/burning_co¤ee.htm, The Guardian, 15th May,
2001.
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and vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance or wholesale price discrimination
as determining to what extent rms have the possibility of strategic mark-up adjustment
along the supply distribution chain and hence a¤ect retail pass-through of upstream cost
shocks. Indeed, this paper is motivated by the fact that vertical contracts and vertical
restraints could explain di¤erent degree of pass-through while the market power, through
elasticities or market concentration, remains unchanged. Such vertical contracts or re-
straints are central preoccupations of Governmentscompetition authorities. For example,
the Bundeskartellamt" in Germany ghts against resale price maintenance, as in France
and the US, through the Gallant Act and the Robinson Patman Act, respectively. This
suggests that these practices are often used in industries and that understanding their
role in the degree of incomplete price transmission of an upstream cost shock remains an
open question in the literature. Our empirical approach has two steps. In the rst step
we estimate the demand parameters, estimate the implied retail and wholesale margins,
and select the best model of retail markups of the retailers and manufacturers among
alternative models following Bonnet and Dubois (2010a). In the second step, to assess the
overall impact of non linear pricing contracts or vertical restraints on rmspass-through
behavior, we employ counterfactual simulations. In doing so, we simulate an upstream
cost shock, re-compute the industry equilibrium that would emerge, and then compare
it to the same cost shock without non linear pricing contracts and/or without vertical
restraints. We interpret the di¤erential response of retail prices across these two cases
as a measure of the overall impact of the possibility of non linear pricing and/or vertical
restraints on the capability of transmitting upstream supply shocks.
Our empirical focus is on the German co¤ee market. Raw co¤ee bean prices are
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important components of marginal costs of the roasted co¤ee industry (Leibtag et al., 2007)
making this a good setting to investigate cost pass-through into retail prices. Moreover,
during our sample period, co¤ee commodity prices steadily declined. We observe that
the decline was not completely passed through into consumer retail prices in the German
market and in other countries as well, as illustrated by the introductory quote in this
paper. In our analysis, we use a retail level scanner data set for the top selling ground
co¤ee products sold at a variety of large retail chains in the German market, that is the
second largest world consumer market, with 9.3% share, relative to the U.S. 21.6% share
(Koerner, 2002).
Our ndings suggest that resale price maintenance between manufacturers and retail-
ers increases the pass-through rate of a ten percent cost shock by more than ten percentage
points relative to the case when resale price maintenance is not allowed in non linear pric-
ing contracts or when double marginalization along the distribution chain is present. The
intuition for our nding is that resale price maintenance makes it less possible for retail-
ers to perform strategic mark-up adjustment when faced with a cost shock. We further
simulate cost shocks under alternative scenarios, with the objective of taking the results
beyond the market at hand. We nd that the less the upstream sector is concentrated,
the larger is the role of non linear pricing contracts in preventing retailers to perform
strategic mark-up adjustments, and thus the higher the pass through increases due to
these contracts. We nd the same implication when rms face less elastic demands.
Empirical documentation of the sources of pass-through in di¤erent settings is often
hampered by a lack of data. In particular, intermediate prices along the distribution
chain, that are called wholesale prices, cost data, and details on vertical contract terms
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are typically unavailable. Our paper is thus closely related to previous literature that mod-
els vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers along the vertical channel
without observing intermediate prices2 where we specify a supply side model of vertical in-
teractions where non linear pricing contracts, such as two part tari¤s, are allowed following
Bonnet and Dubois (2010a).
While previous research has investigated cross country patterns (Campa and Goldberg,
2005, 2006) and determinants of cost pass-through in many markets such as automobiles
(Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Hellerstein and Villas-Boas, 2010; Noton, 2008), beer
(Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2010), and co¤ee (Bettendorf and Verboven, 2000; Nakamura
and Zerom, 2010; Leibtag et al. 2007), this paper extends this literature in several di-
rections, and is the rst analysis to model and consider explicitly the role of non linear
pricing and vertical restraints in explaining the degree of pass-through.
Our paper follows a structural approach to estimate pass-through rates in the German
co¤ee market extending previous work by Leibtag et al. (2007) in several ways. They
use a reduced form approach to relate current changes in U.S. retail co¤ee prices to cur-
rent changes in costs and past changes in prices from a panel data set on commodity,
intermediate, and nal retail prices, for a variety of U.S. markets over time. They nd
that a ten percent increase in costs leads to a 3 percent increase in U.S. retail prices and
that, intermediately, manufacturerswholesale prices adjust perfectly. Our paper di¤ers
from the previous as, by using a structural model, we estimate a model of demand and
supply pricing behavior and use the model for policy simulation. In particular, not only
we simulate the e¤ect of counterfactual changes in costs on the changes in equilibrium
2See Goldberg and Verboven (2005), Manuszak (2001), Mortimer (2008), Villas-Boas and Hellerstein
(2006), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Villas-Boas (2007), and Villas-Boas (2009).
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prices, but also, in addition, the structural model allows us to investigate some of the rea-
sons behind our estimated pass-through rates, that the reduced form approach does not
allow. We do so by performing cost shock simulations under alternative structural model
specications, taking the previous structural model based work (as in Bettendorf and Ver-
boven, 2000; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2010; Hellerstein
and Villas-Boas, 2010) one step further. Hellerstein and Villas-Boas (2010) investigate the
role of multinationals in explaining patterns of pass-through in the automobile industry,
nding there to be a positive empirical relationship between the degree of intra-rm trade
and measures of exchange rate pass-through. A related paper by Nakamura and Zerom
(2010) estimates in the US co¤ee market the long run pass-through rate to be roughly
0.30 taking into account the role of price adjustment (menu) costs. However, they do not
take into account the endogeneity of margins both at the retail and wholesale levels by
xing retail constant margins exogenously. We extend this structural approach by endo-
genizing margins in the whole vertical chain and assessing the role of non linear vertical
pricing in explaining incomplete pass-through rates in the German co¤ee market. Our
approach however abstracts from dynamic considerations considered by Nakamura and
Zerom (2010).
The next section sets up the problem by describing the market and the available data.
Section 3 describes the demand model and then supply models are solved for imperfectly
competing manufacturers selling through imperfectly competing retailers, where linear and
non linear pricing contracts are considered. Section 4 discusses the estimation method and
presents the demand and supply results. Section 5 presents the simulation method and
then turns to discussing the cost pass-through analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes by
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discussing implications of our ndings and avenues for future research extensions.
2 The Market, Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Data and Market
The empirical focus is on the co¤ee market in Germany, the second largest consumer mar-
ket in the world, during the years of 2000 and 2001. This market consists of an interesting
and empirically attractive setup to study pass-through in the presence of imperfectly com-
petitive retailers and manufacturers: while there is a systematic decline in commodity
co¤ee prices during this period we do not nd this trend to be reected completely in
consumer retail prices in the data. For instance, Figure 1 suggests there is incomplete
pass-through of these cost savings into consumer prices. This gure plots weekly data for
raw co¤ee prices obtained from the New York Cost Exchange together with weekly retail
prices for one of the products sold in this market chosen at random (all other products
prices show similar patterns). The gure also plots two smoothed nearest-neighbor regres-
sion lines, one for the predicted values from the regression of the products price on weeks
and the other from the regression of raw co¤ee prices on weeks. The gure graphically
illustrates the relationship between the products price and raw co¤ee price over time.
It shows a positive relationship, although it appears that the response in the products
smoothed price series to the decline in the raw co¤ee smoothed price series is not perfect.
Moreover, while the standard deviation of retail price relative to its average price (or al-
ternatively relative to the modal price) is about 8 percent, the raw co¤ee price standard
deviation relative to its average is 18 percent. Finally, the percent retail price movements
amount only to less than one third of the raw co¤ee percent changes over the same period
of time. We observe empirically a decrease of retail prices from 7.5 to 6.5 ( or -13.3%) and
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Figure 1: Raw co¤ee price and price of Jacobs in Rewe.
a decrease of raw co¤ee prices from 6.2 to 3.3 ( or -46.8%). This simple observation results
in an average pass through of less than one third, suggesting the presence of incomplete
pass-through. Such an average estimate is consistent with the reduced form estimate in
Leibtag et al. (2007) and it suggests there to be incomplete pass-through in this market.
The relatively small number of major rms in this industry is attractive from a model-
ing and empirical perspective. Five manufacturers produce co¤ee and sell it to consumers
via four major retail chains throughout Germany, called Edeka, Markant, Metro, and
Rewe.3 The ve manufacturers produce seven brands in the co¤ee market, and these are
Jacobs, Onko, Melitta, Idee, Dallmayr, Tchibo, and Eduscho. These brands capture more
than 95% of the market, while the rest consists of private label brands and a few minor
3Another major retailer is Aldi, the largest German discounter but unfortunately Aldi does not make
their data available. The co¤ee products produced by the seven manufacturers that are used in this
analysis, are mainly sold to consumers via the above retail chains, and less through vertically integrated
co¤ee shops.
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brands. Jacobs and Onko, who merged in the period before the start of our data set,
are produced by Kraft while Tchibo and Eduscho are brands, previously produced by two
rms but now merged into one, of the same rm called Tchibo.
The empirical analysis is based on a weekly data set on retail prices, aggregate market
shares and product characteristics for seven co¤ee products produced by ve manufacturers
sold at four retail chains.4 Note that there are seven brands at the manufacturer level that
are sold through the di¤erent four retailers and thus creating the choice set equal to twenty
eight products at the retail-consumer level. The price, advertising and market share data
used in the empirical analysis were collected by MADAKOM, Germany, from a national
sample of retail outlets belonging to the four major retailers Edeka, Markant, Metro, and
Rewe, during the years of 2000 and 2001. These data contain weekly information on the
sales, prices, and promotional activity for all brands in the ground co¤ee category. We
focus on the 7 major national brands: the largest being Jacobs with 28% market share,
Onko (20%), Melitta (16%), Idee (12%), Dallmayr (12%), Tchibo (9%), and Eduscho with
3 percent. Private label brands (1.71% market share) and a few minor brands (combined
share of 2.57%) were dropped from the analysis.
Data summary statistics broken up for each of the four retail chains, for each of the
seven brands in the data are available in the Appendix in Table 7, and for more details
see Draganska and Klapper (2007). For the retail chains considered, the data obtained to
perform this analysis were already aggregated across the di¤erent stores for each chain, as
the stores in the same chain have price correlation very close to one and they do appear to
perform chain level retail pricing. Combined market shares for the products sold in Metro
4We thank Daniel Klapper for granting us access to the data.
9
represent over 46% of the market, Markant comes next with 29%, then Edeka with 14%
and nally Rewe with 11%.
Looking at brand presence per retail chain, Jacobs is the market leader, followed by
Melitta and Tchibo. However, Tchibo is the top-selling brand at Rewe. In terms of
descriptive statistics for prices, Markant seems to be o¤ering the lowest overall prices.
Melitta, Jacobs, Onko, and Eduscho are somewhat lower-priced at all retailers, whereas
Idee, Dallmayr and Tchibo occupy the upper end of the market. Price data are expressed
in Deutsche Marks per 500 grams (remember that 1C==1,95583DM). Most of the quantity
time series variation may be attributed to temporary price discounts. This is particularly
true for the leading brands in the market, Jacobs, Tchibo and Melitta.
In terms of promotions data, the dataset contains a dummy variable for the presence
of store-front advertisements, display and feature advertising, and this variable varies by
brand and by retailer. Auxiliary data on total advertising expenditures by brand (but not
by brand and retailer) varies by year.
The quantity data consist of quantities sold for each brand of co¤ee at the di¤erent
retailers. A unit in this data set corresponds to 500 grams of co¤ee, the modal package
size of the products sold. To calculate the market share of each brand allowing for a no
purchase option(also called outside good option), one needs a measure of the size of the
potential market. Market size per retail chain is calculated based on individual consumer
panel data obtained from MADAKOM, which records panelists shopping trips. Given
that the panel is representative, for each chain, the number of shopping trips in a given
week is dened as the total market potential. We then use this measure of market size to
calculate the share of the outside good and the brand shares. The outside market share
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is around 90%, which is quite large.
2.2 Reduced Form Analysis of Pass-Through
Before implementing counterfactual experiments to estimate cost pass-through and assess
the role of vertical restraints or non linear contracts on the retail price transmission, we
look at reduced form analyses of cost pass-through in this market. In doing so, we estimate
a regression in logs of the e¤ect of raw co¤ee cost on the retail price with standard errors
robust to heteroscedasticity. We perform such regressions controlling successively for brand
and retailer xed e¤ects, or manufacturer and retailer xed e¤ects, or product (dened
by the brand and retailer) xed e¤ects. Results in Table 1 always show a positive and
signicant estimate of 0.18 cost pass-through. Moreover, interacting the raw co¤ee cost
variable with retailer dummies or manufacturer dummies, we do not nd any variation
across retailers. We do nd that the point estimate of pass-through varies between 0.08
and 0.31 across manufacturers.
While these reduced form regressions are informative, one has to remark that the
linear specication is quite restrictive by imposing that margins are always the same
regardless of the magnitude of the cost shock, and also regardless of demand responses
to price increases due to adjustments to costs. In the structural analysis, margins are
not constant nor linear but determined endogenously according to the demand shape and
competition game. Moreover, this reduced form approach does not account for competitive
rm behavior through the choice of rm markups given the cost shocks and may then su¤er
from an endogeneity problem of the cost shock on the right hand side. Actually, since the
e¤ect of a common cost shocks on competitors will a¤ect all equilibrium strategies, such
e¤ect on markup and equilibrium price will appear in the residuals of this equation and
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Dependent Variable: Log retail price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(co¤ee cost) 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
log(co¤ee cost)Retailer 1 0.173***
(0.015)
log(co¤ee cost)Retailer 2 0.175***
(0.017)
log(co¤ee cost)Retailer 3 0.196***
(0.021)
log(co¤ee cost)Retailer 4 0.178***
(0.015)
log(co¤ee cost)Manufacturer 1 0.310***
(0.018)
log(co¤ee cost)Manufacturer 2 0.209***
(0.024)
log(co¤ee cost)Manufacturer 3 0.060***
(0.023)
log(co¤ee cost)Manufacturer 4 0.202***
(0.023)
log(co¤ee cost)Manufacturer 5 0.086***
(0.013)
Product (brand*retailer) xed e¤ect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand xed e¤ect Yes No - - - -
Manufacturer xed e¤ect No Yes - - - -
Retailer xed e¤ect Yes Yes - - - -
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
R-squared 0.602 0.496 0.624 0.624 0.624 0.640
Table 1: Reduced form analysis of raw co¤ee cost pass-through.
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be correlated with the cost shock. This motivates us to use a structural model in the
empirical section of this paper to investigate pass-through rates given hypothetical cost
shocks via policy simulations.
3 The Models
The demand model is a standard discrete-choice demand formulation (McFadden 1984;
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Nevo, 2001). We then derive manufacturer and retailer
margins as function of demand substitution patterns in several cases of manufacturers and
retailers relationships. In particular, we suppose linear pricing relationships, non linear
vertical contracts in the form of two part tari¤s with or without resale price maintenance,
and allowing or not for wholesale price discrimination. Finally, we follow Bonnet and
Dubois (2010a) to select the best model to be used as benchmark in the simulation analysis
of cost pass-through.
3.1 Demand
We assume that consumers choose among N di¤erent products indexed by j that consist
of a variety of brands sold at di¤erent retail chains denoted by k, or decide to make no
purchase in the category. Note that, if a certain brand is sold at two di¤erent retail chains
it results in two products at the consumer choice level, since a brand A at chain 1 is
di¤erent from the same brand sold at chain 2. The indirect utility Uijt of consumer i from
purchasing product j = 1; 2; : : : ; N , in time period t = 1; 2; : : : ; T is given by:
Uijt = j   ipjt +Xjtx + jt + "ijt;
where j is a product xed e¤ect capturing the intrinsic preference for product j. The shelf
price of product j at time t is denoted by pjt. We include retailer promotions, manufacturer
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advertising and a time trend in Xjt and the corresponding parameters are in x. The term
jt accounts for weekly changes in factors such as shelf space, positioning of the product
among others that a¤ect consumer utility, are observed by consumers and rms but are
not observed by the researcher. "ijt is an i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed error term
capturing consumer idiosyncratic preferences.
To allow for category expansion or contraction, we include an outside good (no-
purchase option), indexed by j = 0, whose utility is given by:
Ui0kt = "i0kt:
The price coe¢ cient i is assumed to vary across consumers according to i = +vi; vi 
N(0; 1), where  and  are parameters to be estimated. As in Nevo (2000) we rewrite the
utility of consumer i for product j as
Uijt = jt(pjt; Xjt; jt;; ; x) + ijt(pjt; vi;) + "ijt;
where jt is the mean utility, while ijt is the deviation from the mean utility that allows
for consumer heterogeneity in price response.
Let the distribution of ijt across consumers be denoted by F (). The aggregate share
Sjt of product j at time t across all consumers is obtained by integrating the consumer
level probabilities:
Sjt =
Z
exp(jt + ijt)
1 +
PN
n=1 exp(nt + int)
dF (): (1)
This aggregate demand system not only accounts for consumer heterogeneity, but also
provides more exible aggregate substitution patterns than the homogeneous logit model.
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3.2 Supply Models
3.2.1 Linear pricing
On the supply side let us assume a Manufacturer Stackelberg model in which M manu-
facturers set wholesale prices w rst, in a Bertrand-Nash manufacturer-level game, and
then R retailers (chains) follow setting retail prices p in a Bertrand-Nash fashion. Let
each retail chain r marginal costs for product j be given by cj , and let manufacturers
marginal cost be given by j . We also assume that the manufacturers who have merged
behave as if they are the same manufacturer by maximizing joint prots over the set of
products both produce.
Assume each retail chain r maximizes his prot function dened by
r =
X
jSr
M [pj   wj   cj ] sj(p) for r = 1; :::R; (2)
where M is the size of the market, Sr is the set of products sold by retail chain r, and
sj is dened, given a potential market, as the market share of product j. The rst-order
conditions, assuming a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in retail prices, are:
sj +
X
mSr
[pm   wm   cm] @sm(p)
@pj
= 0 for j = 1; :::N (3)
Let Sp be a matrix with general element Sp(j; i) =
@sj
@pi
, containing retail chain level
demand substitution patterns with respect to changes in the retail prices of all products.
We dene Ir (of size (N N)) as the ownership matrix of retailer r which is diagonal and
whose elements Ir(j; j) are equal to 1 if the retailer r sells product j and zero otherwise.
Solving (3) for the price-cost margins for all products in vector notation gives the price-cost
margins r for all products in the retail chains under Nash-Bertrand pricing:
p  w   c| {z }
r
=  [IrSpIr] 1Irs(p); (4)
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which is a system of N implicit functions that expresses the N retail prices as functions of
the wholesale prices. If retail chains behave as Nash-Bertrand players then equation (4)
describes their supply relation.
Manufacturers choose wholesale prices w to maximize their prots given by
f =
X
jSf
M [wj   j ] sj(p(w)); (5)
where Sf is the set of products sold by manufacturer f , and knowing that retail chains
behave according to (4). Consider If the ownership matrix of manufacturer f which is
diagonal and whose element If (j; j) is equal to one if j is produced by the manufacturer
f and zero otherwise. We introduce Pw the (N N) matrix of retail prices responses
to wholesale prices, containing the rst derivatives of the retail prices p with respect to
the wholesale prices w with general element Pw(j; i) =
@pj
@wi
5. Solving for the rst-order
conditions from the manufacturersprot-maximization problem, assuming again a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices and using matrix notation, yields:
(w   )| {z }
 f
=  [IfPwSpIf ] 1Ifs(p); (6)
Under the above model, given the demand parameters  = [  x ], the implied price-
cost margins for all N products can be calculated as () for the retailers and  () for the
manufacturers.
3.2.2 Non Linear Contracts
We consider now that manufacturers and retailers can use non linear contracts in the
form of two part tari¤s. In addition, resale price maintenance (RPM) may be imposed.
Manufacturers may then have the possibility to control retail prices, without necessarily
5See Bonnet and Dubois (2006) for the derivation of Pw.
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imposing the same retails prices to all retail outlets. Finally, we also consider cases where
manufacturers cannot discriminate in wholesale prices, as an additional vertical restriction.
Details on two part tari¤s contracts where wholesale price discrimination is allowed, as
in Bonnet and Dubois (2010b), with and without RPM, are in the appendix. Here we
only derive the margins that result when manufacturers and retailers can use non linear
contracts but now wholesale price discrimination is supposed to be forbidden, as it turns
out to come out as the best model, among the alternatives considered, for this market.
A product is thus dened either by its number in the set of brand (s 2 f1; 2; ::; Nug)
and the number r 2 f1; ::; Rg of the retailer at which it is sold, or by the unique number
i 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng dened as i = (r 1)Nu+s. Remark that the total number of di¤erentiated
products, dened as brand-retail combinations, is N = NuR.
We assume that manufacturers make take-it or leave-it o¤ers to retailers and character-
ize symmetric subgame perfect equilibria as in Rey and Vergé (2010). The manufacturers
o¤ers consist in two-part tari¤s contracts i.e. wholesale prices ws and franchise fees Fsr
paid by the retailer r for selling brand s but also retail prices psr when manufacturers can
use resale price maintenance. Then retailers simultaneously accept or reject the o¤ers that
are public information. If one o¤er is rejected, all contracts are refused. If all o¤ers have
been accepted, retailers simultaneously set their retail prices and demand and contracts
are satised.
Assuming that manufacturers and retailers use these two-part tari¤s contracts, the
prot function of retailer r is given by
r =
X
s2f1;2;::;Nug
[M(psr   ws   csr)ssr(p)  Fsr] : (7)
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The manufacturer f prot is then equal to
f =
X
s2Sf

M(ws   s)
XR
r=1
ssr(p)

+
XR
r=1
Fsr

: (8)
Manufacturers set the two-part tari¤s contracts parameters (wholesale prices and xed
fees) in order to maximize prots subject to the following retailers participation con-
straints for all r = 1; ::; R
r  r; (9)
where 
r
is a xed reservation utility level.
Since manufacturers can always adjust the xed fees such that all the constraints (9)
are binding (Rey and Vergé, 2010), the manufacturers maximization program is
f =
X
k2Sf
M(wk k)
XR
r=1
skr(p)

+
RX
r=1
X
s2Sr
M(psr ws csr)ssr(p) 
RX
r=1

r
+
X
s=2Sf
RX
r=1
Fsr
In the case where resale price maintenance is allowed, manufacturers choose retail prices
while wholesale prices have no direct e¤ect on prot. Therefore, rst order conditions of
the rm f are obtained from the maximization program of her prot for all j 2 Sf and
all r0 2 f1; ::; Rg
RX
r=1
X
k2Sf
(wk   k)
@skr(p)
@pjr0
+ sjr0(p) +
RX
r=1
X
s2Sr
(psr   ws   csr)@ssr(p)
@pjr0
= 0; (10)
and give in matrix notation
IfSpIfu fu + Ifs(p) + (IfSp) = 0:
where Ifu is the ownership matrix of manufacturer f of dimension (NU N) whose ele-
ment Ifu(i; j) is equal to one if the brand i and product j are produced by the manufacturer
f and zero otherwise.
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There is an identication problem because wholesale margins  u and retail margins 
are unknown, and there exists an equilibrium for any vector of wholesale prices. We need
additional assumptions to identify both margins. First, we suppose that wholesale prices
are equal to the marginal cost of production (ws = s). Second, we suppose that wholesale
prices are such that retailers price cost margins are zero (psr(ws)  ws   csr = 0).
In the rst case, retail margins are the same as in the case of wholesale price discrim-
ination (see appendix for more details). In the second case, the expression (14) gives the
following vector of wholesale margins for the manufacturer f
 fu =   (IfSpIfu) 1 Ifs(p): (11)
In the case where resale price maintenance is not allowed, manufacturer f maximizes
prot with respect to wholesale prices and we obtain these rst order conditions for the
manufacturer f
0 =
RX
r=1
X
k2Sf
(wk   k)
@skr(p)
@wj
+
XR
r=1
X
s2Sr
@psr
@wj
ssr(p) +
RX
r=1
X
s2Sr
(psr   ws   csr)@ssr(p)
@wj
;
(12)
for all j 2 Sf and become in matrix notation
IfuPwuSpIfu fu + IfuPwus(p) + IfuPwuSp = 0 (13)
where Pwu is of dimension Nu  N and represents the vector of rst order derivatives of
retails prices with respect to the vector of wholesale prices. This matrix is deduced from
the di¤erentiation of the retailers rst order conditions with respect to wholesale prices
0 =
RX
r=1
X
k2Sf
(wk   k)
@skr(p)
@wj
+
XR
r=1
X
s2Sr
@psr
@wj
ssr(p) +
RX
r=1
X
s2Sr
(psr   ws   csr)@ssr(p)
@wj
:
(14)
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Then, in the case of no resale price maintenance with uniform pricing, wholesale margins
are function of retail margins and demand parameters
 fu =   (IfuPwuSpIfu) 1 [IfuPwus(p) + IfuPwuSp] : (15)
3.3 Testing between alternative models
Once we have estimated the demand and obtained the di¤erent price-cost margins es-
timates according to their expressions for alternative models (obtained in the previous
subsection and detailed in the appendix), we need to test between these alternatives. De-
noting by h and h0 two di¤erent models considered, we can obtain estimates of the total
marginal costs under both models: Chjt and C
h0
jt . Then, one can test between these two
models using non nested tests under the assumption that the total marginal cost Cjt of
product j depends additively on a marginal cost of production b(j)t of the brand b(j) of
product j, on a marginal cost of distribution cr(j)t of the retailer r(j) of product j, and a
mean zero i:i:d: idiosyncratic shock hjt, that is
Chjt = b(j)t + cr(j)t + 
h
jt for all j = 1; ::; J and t = 1; ::; T (16)
Using the relationship between retail prices, total marginal cost and estimated margins
under model h, pjt =  hjt + 
h
jt + C
h
jt, we obtain non nested price equations for models h
and h0.
Under these cost restrictions, we will then test between the two non nested equations

pjt    hjt   hjt =
PB
b=1 
h
bt1b(j)=b +
PR
r=1 c
h
rt1r(j)=r + 
h
jt
pjt    h0jt   h0jt =
PB
b=1 
h0
bt1b(j)=b +
PR
r=1 c
h0
rt1r(j)=r + 
h0
jt
that can be estimated using ordinary least squares.
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The idea of the test consists in testing each model against the others using identifying
restrictions imposed on the cost estimates. The test is used to infer which cost equation
has the best statistical t given the brand and retailer specic dependence of marginal
costs not depending on the conjectured model. Then, we can use non nested tests (Rivers
and Vuong, 2002) to infer which model is statistically the best, and in the next section we
present evidence based on these statistical tests.
4 Model Estimation and Results
4.1 Identication and Estimation Method
When estimating demand, the goal is to derive parameter estimates that produce product
market shares close to the observed ones. This procedure is non-linear in the demand
parameters, and prices enter as endogenous variables. The key step is to construct a
demand side equation that is linear in the parameters associated with the endogenous
variables so that instrumental variables estimation can be directly applied. This follows
from equating the estimated product market shares6 to the observed shares and solving
for the mean utility across all consumers, dened as
jt(; ; x) = j   pjt +Xjtx + jt: (17)
For the mixed Logit model, solving for the mean utility (as in Berry 1994) has to be
done numerically (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995 and Nevo, 2001). Finally, once
this inversion has been made, one obtains equation (17) which is linear in the parameter
associated with price. If we let  be the demand side parameters to be estimated, then  =
(L; ) where L are the linear parameters (; ; x) and  is the non-linear parameter. In
6For the random coe¢ cient model the product market share in equation (1) is approximated by the
Logit smoothed accept-reject simulator.
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the mixed Logit model,  is obtained by feasible Simulated Method of Moments (SMOM)
following Nevos (2000) estimation algorithm, where equation (17) enters in one of the
steps.7
The rst step consists in estimating consistently the demand parameters. In the de-
mand model consumers choose between di¤erent co¤ee products over time, where a prod-
uct is perceived as a bundle of attributes, among which one is price. Since retail prices are
not randomly assigned and likely correlated with demand shocks because retailers take into
account unobserved preferences when setting retail prices, instrumental variables in the es-
timation of demand are required. Retailers consider both observed characteristics, xjt, and
unobserved characteristics, jt. Retailers also account for any changes in their products
characteristics and valuations. A product xed e¤ect is included to capture observed and
unobserved product characteristics/valuations that are constant over time, furthermore,
a time trend captures trending unobserved determinants of demand. The econometric
error that remains in jt will therefore only include the (not-trending) changes in unob-
served product characteristics such as unobserved promotions and changes in shelf display
and/or changes in unobserved consumer preferences. This implies that the prices in (17)
are correlated with changes in unobserved product characteristics a¤ecting demand.
Hence, to obtain a consistent estimate of the price coe¢ cients, instruments are used.
We use, as instruments for prices, direct components of marginal cost, namely world mar-
ket raw co¤ee prices, interacted with product-specic xed e¤ects as in Villas-Boas (2007).
These cost instruments separate cross-co¤ee-brand variation in prices due to exogenous fac-
7The aim is to concentrate the SMOM objective function such that it will be only a function of the
non-linear parameters. By expressing the optimal vector of linear parameters as a function of the non-
linear parameters and then substituting back into the objective function, it can be optimized with respect
to the non-linear parameters alone.
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tors from endogenous variation in prices from unobserved product characteristics changes.
The price decision takes into account exogenous cost-side variables, such as input prices.
The identifying assumption is that changes in unobserved product characteristics jt, such
as changes in shelf display, are most likely not correlated with changes in raw co¤ee average
prices.
The intuition for interacting input prices with product dummies is to allow raw co¤ee
average price to enter the production function of each product di¤erently, maybe because
products use di¤erent blends or purchase from di¤erent regions in the world the raw co¤ee.
The raw co¤ee cost measure used in the analysis is the trade-volume weighted average of
the ve most traded contracts at the New York Stock Exchange adjusted for exchange
rates and taxes.
4.2 Demand Estimates
The demand model estimates are presented in Table 2. The rst set of columns present
the OLS logit estimates without instrumenting for price, the second set of columns present
the instrumental variable Logit model estimates. In the last set of columns consumer het-
erogeneity is considered by allowing the coe¢ cient on price to vary across consumers as
a function of unobserved consumer characteristics, and the Generalized Method of Mo-
ments estimates of the random coe¢ cient specication are presented, where the individual
choice probabilities are given by (1). The rst stage R-squared and F-Statistic are high
suggesting that the instruments used are important in order to consistently estimate de-
mand parameters. Also when comparing the rst two set of columns corresponding to no
instrumentation (OLS) with the other columns to the right, when price is instrumented
for, one notices that the estimates of the other variables a¤ecting utility are robust to
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OLS (1) Logit (2) GMM (3) GMM (4)
Parameter Estimate Std. Estimate Std. Estimate Std. Estimate Std.
Price -0.68 (0.02) -0.75 (0.04) -0.77 (0.07) -0.77 (0.06)
Constant -2.14 (0.14) -1.53 (0.28) -1.62 (0.41) -1.81 (0.40)
Promotion 0.48 (0.015) 0.44 (0.03) 0.47 (0.03) 0.46 (0.03)
Trend -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00)
Advertising 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.00)
Random Coe¤. Price 0.10 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04)
First Stage
F(28,2766) (p-value) 50.78 (0.00) 50.78 (0.00) 50.78 (0.00)
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84
Number of observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
Table 2: Demand Results
Logit (in columns (1)), IV Logit (in columns (2)) and Random Coe¢ cients (in columns (3) and
(4). In column (4) we vary market size.) GMM estimates and White standard errors are in
parenthesis. Product xed e¤ects were included in all specications. Source: Authors
calculations.
instrumentation, and the price parameter increases in absolute value. On average, the
price has a signicant and negative impact on utility and, moreover, when comparing the
Logit with the random coe¢ cient Logit, it appears that unobservable characteristics in the
population seem to a¤ect the price coe¢ cient signicantly. The coe¢ cients of promotion
and advertising are signicantly di¤erent from zero and positive, and are thus demand
expanding factors. There is a signicant and negative time trend e¤ect, which is in line
with the evidence in the market that the overall attractiveness of the category has been
diminishing over time in the German co¤ee market.8 As the outside good market share
is quite large (around 90%), we test the robustness of our demand results with respect to
our denition of the total market and thus of the outside good. We changed arbitrarily
the total market size by decreasing it proportionately by 20 % end then re-estimated the
demand model. We report results in the fourth column of Table 2 and see that demand
estimates are robust.
8 Industry evidence from Germany shows that yearly consumption, measured as kilograms per capita
per year, has fallen by ten percent from over 7.4 in the twelve year period of 1990-2002.
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4.3 Supply Estimates
The demand estimates from the random coe¢ cient specication are used to compute
the implied estimated substitution patterns, which in turn are combined with models
of retail and manufacturer behavior to estimate the retail and wholesale margins. After
estimating the di¤erent price cost margins for all the models, for which summary statistics
are available in Table 8 in the Appendix, we can recover the marginal cost Chjt using
equation Chjt = pjt    hjt + hjt and then estimate the cost equation (16). The estimation
of these cost equations are useful in order to test which model ts best the data. Results
for the Rivers and Vuong (2002) show that the best model appears to be the one where
manufacturers use two-part tari¤s contracts with resale price maintenance, zero retail
margins and no wholesale price discrimination.9 Note that in Germany it is not surprising
to nd uniform pricing since wholesale price discrimination is forbidden for powerful rms
(paragraph 19 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition10 of the German Competition
Authority and article 82c of the European Union Treaty). On the other hand, our result
suggests that manufacturers use resale price maintenance whereas this practice is illegal
in Germany. However, despite its illegality, the German Competition Authority nd cases
where resale price maintenance are used. For example, Phonak GmbH, Ciba Vision and
Microsoft have been accused of having inuenced the resale prices in an anticompetitive
manner. It would not be surprising to nd such a practice in the German Co¤ee Market
9This corresponds to model 5 in Table 9 in the Appendix. Table 9 shows the results from the non
nested test statistics. Recall that for a 5% size of test, the assumption that the two non-nested models are
asymptotically equivalent is rejected in favor of the assumption that the model in column is asymptotically
better than the model in row if the test statistic is lower than the critical value -1.64. In the same way,
the assumption that the two non-nested models are asymptotically equivalent is rejected in favor of the
assumption that the model in row is asymptotically better than the model in column if the test statistic
is higher than the critical value 1.64.
10http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/GWB/0911_GWB_7_Novelle_E.pdf .
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to reduce competition.
Subtracting the estimated margins we obtain, with an average margin of 17.53%, from
retail prices we also recover the sum of retail and manufacturer marginal costs of all
products for the preferred model. The average estimated recovered cost of 5.9 Deutsche
Marks per unit is very plausible (a unit is 500 grams), according to industry research, and
also within the ball-park when comparing with the average raw co¤ee price after adjusting
for the expected loss in volume when produced. Starting with an average raw co¤ee price
including tax per unit (500 grams) of slightly over 4 Deutsche Marks, and given that there
is a 15 to 25 % weight loss in the process of roasting the co¤ee which also needs to be
taken into account when calculating the cost per unit of co¤ee, one obtains an interval of
[5:04; 5:7] Deutsche Marks per 500 grams. If distribution costs and other production costs
are taken into account, this estimated cost is very plausible. The raw co¤ee cost would
then represent 90 % of total marginal cost.11 On the US co¤ee market, the raw co¤ee
cost represents more than half of the marginal cost of co¤ee production according to the
paper of Nakamura and Zerom (2010). The fact that the other costs (distribution, labor,
transportation) seem more important in the US can also be explained by the geography
of the country (inducing larger transportation costs) and other macroeconomic di¤erences
di¢ cult to identify precisely.
11Although we found no directly comparable (same time period and country) estimates, in a related
study for Germany in earlier periods Koerner (2002) nds that co¤ee beans cost are 67% of the total
production value. Although this is not the same as our total marginal cost, more importantly, the interest
rate was much higher during our period of analysis relative to Koerner (2002), thus, it seems plausible
that the co¤ee bean price in DM is much larger and represents a larger share of the total marginal cost in
2000 and 2001. Both this and the other paper suggests though that, on average inputs factors (as roasting,
grinding packaging) count for very little in marginal costs.
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5 Analysis of Cost Pass-Through into Retail Prices
The estimation of the structural demand and cost parameters allows to investigate the
role of non linear pricing on explaining incomplete pass-through via counterfactual policy
experiments. Lets present rst the method used to simulate these counterfactual policy
experiments and then discuss the particular policies and simulation considered.
We consider the preferred pricing equilibrium according to our data (model 5 in Table
9) to estimate a vector of marginal costs of production and distribution. We denote
Ct = (C1t; ::; Cjt; ::; CJt) the vector of these marginal costs for all products present at time
t, where Cjt is obtained by
Cjt = pjt    jt   jt:
Then, given these marginal costs estimated and the other estimated structural parameters,
one can simulate the policy experiments of interest. Thus, lets consider the policy exper-
iment where manufacturers and retailers relationships change. Then we have to change
the equilibrium equation and solve
min
fpjtgj=1;::;J
kpt    t (pt )  t (pt )  Ctk ;
where k:k is a norm of RJ , in practice we will take the Euclidean norm in RJ ; and the
formula of t and  t correspond respectively to the expression of the margins of the supply
model simulated. For example, in the case of linear pricing, with matrix notation, they
are
p  w   c| {z }
r
=  [IrSpIr] 1Irs(p);
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for retail margins and
(w   )| {z }
 f
=  [IfPwSpIf ] 1Ifs(p);
for wholesale margins, which gives
  +  =  
XR
r=1
[IrSpIr]
 1Irs(p) 
XF
f=1
[IfPwSpIf ]
 1Ifs(p):
We then obtain new equilibrium prices in the linear pricing contracts pL between
manufacturers and retailers.
For the simulation of the upstream cost shock , for instance we use  = 1:1 for an
increase of 10% of the total production and distribution marginal cost, and equilibrium
prices pL;c are deduced from the following minimization program
min
fpjtgj=1;::;J
kpt    t (pt )  t (pt )   Ctk :
We interpret the di¤erence between the new prices equilibrium of pL;c and p

L as
the retail price change from the 10% cost shock in the case of linear pricing. For other
equilibrium models (two part tari¤s without RPM etc...), we use the same method but
with a di¤erent equation for margins.
It has to be noted that, whatever the model simulated, equilibrium prices depend only
on total marginal cost. Thus, the e¤ect of production or distribution cost shocks that
result in the same total marginal cost will always be the same.
5.1 The Role of Non Linear Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Pass-
Through
Table 3 shows the percent retail price changes from a proportional shocks on the total
marginal cost of 10%. Each column reports percent price changes under di¤erent supply
models of vertical restraints. Along each column of Table 3 we report the simulated
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average percent retail price changes in the rst row, then the changes broken up by brand
in the next block of rows, and in the bottom of the table the retail price percent changes
broken up by retailer. The rst column of Table 3 corresponds to the model where double
marginalization along the distribution chain is present, i.e., under linear pricing. Then
columns 2 until 5 report price changes under models considering di¤erent types of vertical
restraints. In columns 2 and 3 the rms decide pricing without RPM restrictions, while
columns 4 and 5 consider that there are RPM restrictions (in the particular equilibrium of
zero retail margins). We also consider the distinction between uniform wholesale pricing
and no uniform wholesale pricing, and we label columns 2 and 4 as corresponding to
Uniform Pricing cases, while columns 3 and 5 are not. We also have to note that, on
average, a cost shock of 10% on total marginal cost corresponds to a cost shock of 11%
on the co¤ee commodity price because commodity co¤ee cost represents roughly 90% of
total marginal costs.
Our objective is to compare each column with another column and interpret the dif-
ferential retail price change as the result of adding or eliminating vertical restraints. First,
we nd that the uniform pricing restriction has no impact on the pass-through, as can be
seen by comparing columns 4 and 5 (for RPM) or without RPM by comparing columns
2 and 3, since they dont have statistically di¤erent mean pass-through into retail prices.
Second, looking at averages we can see that for the linear pricing model (column 1) and for
the non linear pricing without resale price maintenance the simulated retail prices change
less, namely by 7.14% and 7.00% respectively. We can also note that non linear pricing
contracts have a signicant but small negative e¤ect (-0.14%) on pass-through relative to
linear pricing. Third, the simulated results show in columns 4 and 5 that two-part tari¤s
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear/Non Linear Pricing Linear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear
Resale Price Maintenance No No No Yes Yes
Uniform Pricing No Yes No Yes No
Price Change in %
Average 7.14 (0.40) 7.00 (0.40) 7.00 (0.46) 8.20 (0.32) 8.20 (0.33)
Brands
Jacobs 7.02 (0.34) 6.91 (0.32) 6.84 (0.76) 8.08 (0.28) 8.08 (0.28)
Onko 6.74 (0.40) 6.59 (0.39) 6.53 (0.77) 7.78 (0.33) 7.85 (0.34)
Melitta 6.85 (0.32) 6.69 (0.32) 6.62 (0.74) 8.04 (0.23) 8.04 (0.24)
Idee 7.52 (0.23) 7.36 (0.23) 8.00 (1.02) 8.55 (0.15) 8.56 (0.16)
Dallmayr 7.37 (0.28) 7.22 (0.27) 7.55 (0.82) 8.42 (0.17) 8.43 (0.18)
Tchibo 7.40 (0.16) 7.30 (0.17) 7.23 (0.74) 8.35 (0.12) 8.35 (0.12)
Eduscho 7.07 (0.25) 6.95 (0.25) 6.88 (0.74) 8.11 (0.19) 8.11 (0.19)
Retailer
Edeka 7.13 (0.37) 6.99 (0.38) 6.92 (0.79) 8.18 (0.31) 8.18 (0.31)
Markant 7.03 (0.41) 6.90 (0.41) 6.83 (0.80) 8.14 (0.32) 8.14 (0.33)
Metro 7.15 (0.43) 7.03 (0.41) 6.96 (0.81) 8.23 (0.34) 8.24 (034)
Rewe 7.24 (0.36) 7.09 (0.37) 7.66 (0.99) 8.25 (0.29) 8.25 (0.30)
Table 3: Percentage of Retail Price Change with 10 Percent Increase of Total
Marginal Cost.
contracts with resale price maintenance lead to a larger pass-through, as a 10% cost shock
has an e¤ect of an average 8:20% increase on retail prices, regardless of whether wholesale
uniform pricing is imposed. The fourth columns preferred model has the same e¤ects as
in the fth column, as previously mentioned, as wholesale price discrimination related re-
straints add little to explaining pass-through. Taken together, these results would suggest
that the vertical restraint in the form of resale price maintenance, increases the percent
retail pass-through of a ten percent cost shock by more than one percentage point relative
to the case when this vertical restraint is not allowed in non linear pricing contracts or
when double marginalization along the distribution chain is present. This can be seen by
comparing the last two columns with the rst three of Table 3. The intuition of such a re-
sult is that without resale price maintenance, the double marginalization problem remains
and implies that the manufacturers cannot price at the monopoly" level. They thus have
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to set lower prices and obtain lower margins because they cannot collect the full variable
prot. Therefore, as double marginalization serves to dampen pass-through compared to
full prot maximization (e.g. Goldberg and Verboven, 2001) our result that Resale Price
Maintenance increases the pass-through of a cost shock in the case of non linear contracts
seems consistent.
We interpret the di¤erential response of retail prices across cases as a measure of the
overall impact of the possibility of vertical restraint on the capability of transmitting
upstream supply shocks. The contribution of these contracts in increasing pass-through of
a 10% cost shock is between 1:2% for the brand Melitta and 0:95% for the brand Tchibo.
We also implement counterfactual simulations when shocks increase the raw co¤ee cost
instead of the total marginal cost as was the case in Table 3. We use results from the
regression of total marginal cost on the raw co¤ee cost (Table 10 in Appendix) to estimate
total marginal costs of each product after a raw co¤ee price increase of 10%. Table 10
shows that a 100% increase in raw co¤ee price induces an increase between 22 and 30% in
total marginal cost for all models after controlling for brands and retailer e¤ects or product
xed e¤ects (in levels, the coe¢ cient of correlation is around 0.25-0.26). This correlation
does not mean that the raw co¤ee price represents a small part of total marginal cost (and
average values of retail prices and raw co¤ee prices show this is impossible) because of the
other correlated characteristics explaining marginal cost.
It is interesting that the raw co¤ee cost coe¢ cient is larger in the marginal cost re-
gression of Table 10 than in the reduced formprice regression of Table 1. This suggests
markup adjustment and the role of nonlinear wholesale pricing is indeed relevant. 12
12Furthermore, results are very robust to alternative input price marginal costs specications. For
instance, if we include taxes and wages in the marginal cost specications in addition to raw co¤ee in
the input regressions, results are very comparable. When including these additional inputs, the point
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Retail prices do vary less with row co¤ee price that total marginal cost of producers.
Next, given the new total marginal costs, we simulate the counterfactual equilibrium
prices. Table 4 shows the percent retail price changes from a proportional shock on the
raw co¤ee price of 10% under di¤erent supply models of vertical restraints. We can
observe that the pass-through of raw co¤ee price to retail prices is lower than the pass-
through estimated in Table 3. We obtain on average that a 10% increase in commodity
price implies a 6% increase in retail prices on average, with some heterogeneity across
brands and retailers. This pass-through is higher than the reduced form one. As discussed
previously, while the reduced form regression is informative, one has to take note that it
implies that margins are always the same regardless of the magnitude of the cost shock,
and also regardless of demand responses to price increases.
The values of pass-through on co¤ee products are larger than those of Leibtag et
al. (2007) obtained with a reduced form approach and those of Nakamura and Zerom
(2010) who nd a pass-through rate of 0.30. The di¤erence with the dynamic approach
of Nakamura and Zerom (2010) can be due to several factors. For instance, while our
demand elasticity is 5 percent, quite elastic, the estimates of demand elasticity for co¤ee
in the US are much smaller according to previous studies, and thus are consistent with a
much lower pass-through rate into retail prices13. As a preview, we perform in the next
subsection some alternative scenarios where we reduce demand elasticity closer to US levels
and indeed obtain much smaller retail pass-through rates. The di¤erence in pass-through
estimates of pass-through is lower, the raw co¤ee cost coe¢ cient is between 20 and 28% in the marginal
cost regression and it remains larger than 16:7% obtained in this case with the "reduced form" price
regression.
13Studies using data for the 1980s and 1990s estimate demand elasticities for co¤ee in the U.S. around
2 and 4 percent (Bell et al., 1999, Chiang, 1991, Krishnamurthi and Paj, 1998, and Nakamura and Zerom,
2010).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Linear/Non Linear Pricing Linear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear
Resale Price Maintenance No No No Yes Yes
Uniform Pricing No Yes No Yes No
Price Change in %
Average 5.42 (1.70) 5.13 (0.98) 5.31 (2.07) 6.03 (1.18) 6.03 (1.18)
Brands
Jacobs 5.52 (1.65) 5.26 (0.85) 5.44 (1.93) 6.15 (0.99) 6.15 (0.99)
Onko 6.03 (1.76) 5.74 (0.89) 5.95 (2.35) 6.83 (1.08) 6.83 (1.08)
Melitta 5.91 (1.78) 5.61 (0.97) 5.83 (2.38) 6.75 (1.17) 6.75 (1.16)
Idee 4.91 (1.58) 4.60 (0.88) 4.74 (1.73) 5.38 (1.03) 5.38 (1.03)
Dallmayr 5.11 (1.55) 4.80 (0.83) 4.96 (1.81) 5.63 (0.97) 5.63 (0.97)
Tchibo 4.97 (1.55) 4.68 (0.82) 4.87 (2.04) 5.38 (0.93) 5.38 (0.93)
Eduscho 5.48 (1.67) 5.23 (0.97) 5.39 (1.82) 6.12 (1.41) 6.12 (1.14)
Retailer
Edeka 5.50 (1.72) 5.20 (0.98) 5.38 (2.04) 6.11 (1.18) 6.11 (1.18)
Markant 5.54 (1.72) 5.27 (1.02) 5.45 (2.14) 6.24 (1.24) 6.24 (1.24)
Metro 5.28 (1.65) 5.02 (0.95) 5.20 (2.11) 5.91 (1.15) 5.91 (1.15)
Rewe 5.35 (1.69) 5.04 (0.95) 5.21 (1.98) 5.88 (1.13) 5.88 (1.13)
Table 4: The Role of Non Linear Pricing and Vertical Restraints on Pass-
Through from a raw co¤ee cost shock.
rate can be also due to the concentration of the market. The US co¤ee market is highly
concentrated with respect to the German market. Indeed, the two main manufacturers
in the US market have a market share of 38 and 33 percent by volume respectively from
2000 to 2004. The pass-through rate is then larger for the less concentrated German co¤ee
market.
While we now have an idea of the non trivial role of non linear pricing contracts
or vertical restraints in varying pass-through for this German co¤ee market, we want
to investigate the contribution on RPM contracts under alternative demand and supply
scenarios. We do this in the next subsection.
5.2 The Role of Non Linear Pricing on Pass-through under Alternative
Scenarios
In this last subsection we aim at identifying some of the potential reasons as to why non
linear pricing contracts and vertical restraints a¤ect pass-through and, in doing so, derive
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pre-merger post-merger post-merger post-merger
Average Demand Elasticity -5 -5 -4 -3
Model
Liner Pricing %p 7.43 (0.71) 7.14 (0.40) 6.69 (0.44) 6.11 (0.59)
PT Rate 0.74 (0.07) 0.71 (0.04) 0.67 (0.04) 0.61 (0.06)
Non Linear Pricing %p 7.14 (0.61) 7.00 (0.46) 6.57 (0.49) 6.01 (0.50)
PT Rate 0.71 (0.06) 0.70 (0.05) 0.66 (0.05) 0.60 (0.05)
Non Linear Pricing with RPM %p 8.72 (0.85) 8.20 (0.32) 7.87 (0.36) 7.37 (0.42)
PT Rate 0.87 (0.09) 0.82 (0.03) 0.79 (0.04) 0.74 (0.04)
Table 5: Percentage Change of Retail Price with Cost Increase of 10%
implications beyond the market at hand. We start by investigating the role of non linear
contracts and vertical restraints for several di¤erent degrees of market power and results
are reported in Table 5.
The rst row of Table 5 reports simulated retail price changes due to a ten percent cost
shock and the second row the corresponding pass-through rate for the linear pricing model.
The third and forth rows represent the percent change and rate of change, respectively, for
the non linear pricing model without resale price maintenance and the bottom two rows
present the change of retail prices and the pass-through rate for the non linear pricing
model with resale price maintenance. In the rst column of Table 5 we simulate pass-
through rates for a supply case where the manufacturer market is more competitive than
in reality. We do this by simulating prices as if the brands Jacobs and Onko, and Tchibo
and Eduscho were all produced by independent rms. This corresponds to the market
situation before the two mergers in the 1990s and we label this column the pre-merger
case. For this scenario we keep the underlying demand model that corresponds to an
average demand elasticity of 5. The second column corresponds to the Table 5 results,
where the elasticity is 5 and the rms have merged. Columns 3 and 4 have the rms
already merged but decrease demand elasticity in absolute value to 4 and 3, respectively.
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The change of the average elasticity which is estimated to be around 5 is done by changing
directly the mean utility price parameter  in the demand model without changing other
parameters. This is a simple modication which, after empirical checks, happen to change
almost proportionately all own and cross price elasticities of product such that when
decreasing the average own price elasticity from 5 to 4 or 5 to 3 by decreasing , cross
price elasticities also decrease. Indeed the range of cross price elasticities is [0.14 ;0.17]
when the average own price elasticity of -5, it is [0.10 ;0.12] when own price elasticity is
on average -4 and [0.7 ;0.9] when it is -3. Thus, there is no discrepancy on their e¤ect on
competition between own and cross price elasticities when changing . Going from left
to right the market is becoming less and less competitive and thus our pass-through rates
should decrease when the rms face the same ten percent cost shock. This is the theoretical
prediction in Bettendorf and Verboven (2000) where they show that markup absorption
is more important in oligopolies than competitive markets and that as consumers become
less price elastic, pass-through will be less incomplete. We do indeed provide consistent
evidence of this to be the case. For the linear pricing model, retail price changes go from
7:3% in the pre-merger case and with a very elastic demand (Elasticity=5) down to 6:11%
in the least competitive scenario of merged rms and demand elasticity of 3. The same
pattern occurs in the Non Linear Pricing cases, as pass-through rates decrease from 71% to
60% and from 87% to 74% without RPM and with RPM, respectively. The point estimates
of the di¤erence between Linear Pricing and Non Linear Pricing with RPM point to the
following economic force: the contribution of the RPM in increasing pass-through rates is
larger the bigger market power in the market (or the smaller elasticities). This is the case
as the point estimates from the second to the fourth column of Table 5 increase as the
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Market Size Reference Reference0:8
Liner Pricing %p 7.14 (0.40) 6.88 (0.39)
PT Rate 0.71 (0.04) 0.69 (0.04)
Non Linear Pricing %p 7.00 (0.46) 6.77 (0.38)
PT Rate 0.70 (0.05) 0.68 (0.04)
Non Linear Pricing with RPM %p 8.20 (0.32) 8.10 (0.29)
PT Rate 0.82 (0.03) 0.81 (0.03)
Table 6: Percentage Change of Retail Price with Cost Increase of 10% with
Varying Market Size
demand elasticity decreases14. Interestingly, the larger manufacturer collusion, column 1
to column 2, the smaller the e¤ect of RPM in explaining the drop in pass-through. The
ndings mentioned above show that not only demand elasticities can a¤ect the degree
of pass-through but also existing vertical contracts. Supposing that consumers demand
becomes less elastic, a lower elasticity will a¤ect di¤erently pass-through in the industry
depending on the nature of vertical contracts.
Finally, we also report the results of the counterfactual simulation of the pass-through
that would be obtained in the case where the market size would be 20% smaller than what
we have chosen for the main estimation. Table 6 show the results which are quite similar
to the case where the price elasticity is smaller, a result that is quite intuitive.
6 Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we consider the implications of the rms using non-linear pricing and ver-
tical restraints such as resale price maintenance or wholesale price discrimination in the
ability to make strategic mark-up adjustments when faced with upstream cost shocks. For
markets such as co¤ee, where the raw commodity cost su¤ers from large uctuations and
14All contributions of the resale price maintenance assumption in Table 5 are statistically and signicantly
di¤erent from each other according to the mean comparison test.
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is a substantial component of production costs, understanding the reasons of incomplete
pass-through is an important question. We use a structural model approach to investigate
the role of non linear pricing contracts and vertical restraints in a¤ecting the way rms
along a distribution chain are able to adjust to upstream cost shocks. We nd that the
resale price maintenance assumption has a role in explaining why pass-through is larger
in this market when compared to linear pricing. Taking the results beyond this market,
we nd that when upstream cost shocks hit the markets with higher market power then
the retail pass through decreases. As rmsability to adjust mark-ups is restricted by
resale price maintenance assumption, the larger market power in the market, there is a
force towards resale price maintenance assumption becoming increasingly important in
a¤ecting the degree of pass-through. Next, while more upstream market power leads to
overall lower pass-through, the contribution of resale price maintenance assumption be-
comes less important. These results suggest that not only demand elasticities can explain
the di¤erent pass-through in various industries but vertical relationships can also be a fac-
tor drawing pass-through down or up. Moreover, market concentration may not decrease
pass-through rates in the same magnitude, depending on the nature of vertical contracts.
This suggests also that merger policy may want to analyze also e¤ects on cost pass-through
according to vertical contracting practices. Also, the regulation of vertical contracts, in
particular allowing RPM or not, will not only have an e¤ect on the level of prices but
also on cost pass-through. It is also interesting to remark that cost pass-through being so
di¤erent according to the vertical contracts used, mergers may not only necessarily lead
to a reduction of pass-through via a dampening of competition but may lead to a change
in vertical contracts and eventually to higher pass-through if vertical restraints such as
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RPM are used post merger.
Finally, we can think of examples of industries where we might explain more or less
pass-through mostly because of di¤erent levels of concentration of the upstream market
or di¤erent elasticity of demand and not because of more or less vertical restraints. For
example, concentrated processed food markets, such as breakfast cereals and yogurt, may
have smaller pass-trough rates than other food markets such as fruits and vegetables, just
because they are more concentrated markets although they are typically more prone to
non linear pricing and resale price maintenance in vertical contracting.
Our approach could be extended along several dimensions by considering di¤erent
functional form assumptions of demand, vertical contracts, and marginal costs. Further-
more, while our model is static, one extension of the present paper is to consider dynamic
issues (as in Nakamura and Zerom 2010, and Noton 2008) while modeling explicitly the
vertical pricing negotiations. Nakamura and Zerom (2010), for the co¤ee market, and
Noton (2008), for the automobile market, take the static approach started in Goldberg
and Verboven (2001) and Hellerstein (2008) one step further to tackle the role of price
adjustment (menu) costs, to explain price movements. For the co¤ee market, Nakamura
and Zerom (2010) nd that only two percent of the incomplete pass-through of cost shocks
in the U.S. can be explained by the existence of menu costs and the most relevant factors
responsible for the incomplete pass-through are static: local costs and markup adjust-
ments. While comforting to our approach that according to Nakamura and Zerom (2010))
dynamic factors did contribute the least to explaining the phenomenon, we acknowledge
that considering a static approach is a limitation. However, one limitation of Nakamura
and Zerom (2010) and Noton (2008) is that they abstract from vertical strategic behavior
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of sequential rms, by specifying a reduced form vertical pricing rule, leaving to future
work combining both dynamic and strategic pricing into the model.
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A Details on Non Linear Contracts
Here we consider that manufacturers and retailers can use non linear contracts when
wholesale price discrimination is allowed as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010a) and we refer
the reader to this reference for more details, as what follows is a brief derivation. In the
case of these two part tari¤s contracts, the prot function of retailer r is
r =
X
j2Sr
[M(pj   wj   cj)sj(p)  Fj ]
and the prot function of rm f is equal to
f =
X
k2Sf
[M(wk   k)sk(p) + Fk]:
We will assume like in the case of wholesale uniform pricing that manufacturer f chooses
the terms of the contracts in order to maximize prots f subject to the following retailers
participation constraints (9). As in the wholesale uniform pricing case, constraints are
binding. Therefore the prot of each rm f can be re-written and its expression is the
following one
max
fpkg2Ff
X
k2Sf
(pk   k   ck)sk(p) +
X
k 62Sf
(pk   wk   ck)sk(p):
In the case where resale price maintenance is allowed, the set of rst order conditions in
matrix notation for manufacturer f are
IfSp + Ifs(p) + IfSpIf f = 0: (18)
Again there is an identication problem because   and  are unknown and we need addi-
tional restrictions to get identication. As before, we assume that the wholesale margins
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  are equal to zero (wk = k) or retail margins  are zero (p

k(w

k)  wk   ck = 0). First,
when wk = k, the expression (18) can be re-written stacking all the rst order conditions
IfSp + Ifs(p) = 0:
This expression can be simplied to the case where the total prot of the integrated
industry are maximized (Rey and Vergé, 2010)
 = S 1p s(p):
Second, when pk(w

k)  wk   ck = 0, then (18) becomes
Ifs(p) + IfSpIf f = 0
and we obtain this expression for the vector of wholesale margins of the manufacturer f
 f =  (IfSpIf ) 1Ifs(p):
In the case where resale price maintenance is not allowed, the total price cost margin
deduced from the rst order conditions of the manufacturers maximization program is
such that for all f = 1; ::; F (Bonnet and Dubois, 2010a) we get
f +  f = (IfPwSpIf )
 1 [ IfPws(p)  IfPwSp (I   If ) ] (19)
where  is the vector of all retailers margins deduced from the expression (4).
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Prices Std Price Shares Promotion Advertising
Retailer Edeka
Jacobs 6.815 0.325 30.359 1.277 2.335
Onko 5.980 0.564 8.547 1.057 0.224
M elitta 6.241 0.320 12.706 1.018 1.776
Idee 8.008 0.638 4.989 0.726 0.302
Dallm ayr 7.314 0.421 15.820 1.166 1.618
Tchib o 7.893 0.422 17.951 0.661 1.640
Eduscho 6.960 0.499 9.628 0.932 1.465
Retailer M arkant
Jacobs 6.537 0.523 30.619 1.024 2.335
Onko 5.978 0.541 7.306 1.033 0.224
M elitta 5.965 0.440 19.581 1.290 1.776
Idee 7.779 0.697 3.709 0.783 0.302
Dallm ayr 7.304 0.491 12.248 0.939 1.618
Tchib o 7.826 0.446 15.845 0.684 1.640
Eduscho 6.916 0.553 10.692 0.904 1.465
Retailer M etro
Jacobs 7.093 0.724 27.485 0.921 2.335
Onko 6.557 0.808 10.172 0.577 0.224
M elitta 6.669 0.808 23.375 0.857 1.776
Idee 8.093 0.930 3.735 0.536 0.302
Dallm ayr 7.818 0.666 11.091 0.710 1.618
Tchib o 7.738 0.512 11.841 0.694 1.640
Eduscho 6.958 0.603 12.301 0.910 1.465
Retailer Rewe
Jacobs 7.039 0.537 23.350 0.688 2.335
Onko 6.296 0.397 7.157 0.578 0.224
M elitta 6.565 0.392 15.892 0.863 1.776
Idee 8.279 0.480 2.812 0.410 0.302
Dallm ayr 8.109 0.817 7.806 0.448 1.618
Tchib o 7.912 0.444 28.434 1.025 1.640
Eduscho 6.919 0.528 14.549 1.134 1.465
By Retailers
Edeka 7.017 0.721 13.528 0.866 9.360
Markant 6.769 0.829 29.072 0.991 9.360
M etro 7.117 0.864 46.697 0.805 9.360
Rewe 7.260 0.829 10.703 0.842 9.360
Raw Co¤ee Price 4.482 0.779
Table 7: Summary Statistics for the 28 Products in Sample and Raw Co¤ee
Prices.
The mean of the variables in the data is reported. Prices are in Deutsche Marks per 500
grams, Quantity in units sold of 500 grams, and Advertising in Million Euros. Source:
MADAKOM, Germany. Raw Co¤ee Prices are from the New York Stock Exchange.
46
Supply models Model Price-Cost Margins
(% of retail price p)
Mean Std.
Linear Pricing (Double Marginalization) (1)
Retailers 17.49 2.61
Manufacturers 17.51 6.38
Total 35.00 7.84
No uniform pricing
Two part Tari¤s with RPM
Manufacturer Marginal cost pricing (w = ) (2) 18.56 2.76
Zero retail margin (p = w + c) (3) 17.48 2.69
Two-part Tari¤s (without RPM)
Retailers (4) 18.51 2.83
Manufacturers 17.49 2.61
Total 36.00 5.40
Uniform pricing
Two part Tari¤s with RPM
Manufacturer Marginal cost pricing (p = w + c) (5) 17.53 2.66
Two-part Tari¤s (without RPM)
Retailers (6) 18.51 2.74
Manufacturers 17.51 6.38
Total 36.00 5.34
Table 8: Estimated Price-Cost Margins.
 H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6
1 -2.87 -2.84 2.77 -2.94 -2.84
2 29.89 6.23 -33.54 29.91
3 4.33 -33.20 -11.93
4 -9.69 4.53
5 33.37
Table 9: Non Nested Tests (Rivers and Vuong, 2002).
This Table shows the results from the non nested test statistics. Recall that for a 5% size
of test, the assumption that the two non-nested models are asymptotically equivalent is
rejected in favor of the assumption that the model in column is asymptotically better
than the model in row if the test statistic is lower than the critical value -1.64. In the
same way, the assumption that the two non-nested models are asymptotically equivalent
is rejected in favor of the assumption that the model in row is asymptotically better than
the model in column if the test statistic is higher than the critical value 1.64.
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Dep. Var.: Log marginal cost (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L inear/Non Linear Pricing L inear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear Non Linear
Resale Price Maintenance No Yes No No Yes
Uniform Pricing No No No Yes Yes
Log raw co¤ee price 0.290*** 0.290*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.222*** 0.222***
(0.0156) (0 .0154) (0 .0114) (0 .0112) (0 .0154) (0 .0151) (0 .0153) (0 .0150) (0 .0114) (0 .0111)
Brand dumm ies (reference is Eduscho)
Jacobs -0 .0177* -0 .0150** -0 .0196* -0 .0205** -0 .0155**
(0.0103) (0 .00752) (0 .0101) (0 .0100) (0 .00750)
Onko -0.194*** -0 .147*** -0 .200*** -0 .200*** -0 .147***
(0.0115) (0 .00843) (0 .0116) (0 .0116) (0 .00840)
M elitta -0 .151*** -0 .109*** -0 .151*** -0 .151*** -0 .110***
(0.0129) (0 .00781) (0 .0105) (0 .0105) (0 .00777)
Idee 0.228*** 0.183*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.182***
(0.00944) (0 .00732) (0 .00954) (0 .00951) (0 .00730)
Dallm ayr 0.150*** 0.118*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.117***
(0.00945) (0 .00737) (0 .00970) (0 .00959) (0 .00734)
Tchib o 0.194*** 0.152*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.152***
(0.00845) (0 .00648) (0 .00846) (0 .00845) (0 .00647)
Retailer Dumm ies (reference is Rewe)
Edeka -0 .0614*** -0 .0466*** -0 .0611*** -0 .0609*** -0 .0461***
(0.00636) (0 .00486) (0 .00645) (0 .00644) (0 .00484)
Markant -0 .0999*** -0 .0709*** -0 .0976*** -0 .0970*** -0 .0702***
(0.00686) (0 .00517) (0 .00698) (0 .00692) (0 .00514)
M etro -0 .0244*** -0 .00584 -0 .0150* -0 .0150* -0 .00580
(0.00941) (0 .00612) (0 .00820) (0 .00818) (0 .00608)
Product F ixed E¤ect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R -squared 0.541 0.557 0.597 0.618 0.583 0.603 0.585 0.606 0.599 0.620
Observations 2795 2795 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800 2800
Table 10: Reduced form regressions of total marginal costs.
Note: OLS regression with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity
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